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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs’ baseless rhetoric1
In any event, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) falls well within Congress’s 
constitutional authority.  Contrary to plaintiffs’ accusation that upholding the minimum 
coverage provision would remove all limits on the commerce power, Supreme Court 
precedent already establishes limits; specifically, that non-economic, standalone 
measures fall outside the bounds of the commerce power.  The minimum coverage 
provision falls well within these limits.  In addition, the requirement is necessary and 
proper to ensure the success of the ACA’s guaranteed issue and community rating 
 cannot obscure the fact that there is no standing here.  
Despite attaching a new affidavit in an effort to show standing, plaintiff Coons still does 
not allege that he is currently taking any steps in anticipation of having to comply with 
the minimum coverage provision.  This failure is dispositive.  For his part, Dr. Novack 
provides no reason to believe that any proposal the Independent Payment Advisory Board 
(“IPAB” or the “Board”) may issue years from now will affect his practice.  And 
Representatives Flake and Frank, as legislators, plainly lack standing under well-
established Supreme Court precedent to challenge the constitutionality of the Board.  See 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).  This case should therefore be dismissed in its 
entirety for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
                                                          
1  For example, plaintiffs say that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act “stands 
as one of the greatest intrusions into individual liberty this nation has ever seen,” Pls.’ 
Reply in Supp. of Mot. For Summ. J., ECF No. 70 (“Pls.’ Reply”), at 1, and that the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board is “immune from our Constitution’s system of 
checks and balances that protects our nation against tyranny,” id. at 9 (citing Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996)). 
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insurance reforms.  And the provision is also a valid exercise of the taxing power.  For 
these reasons, plaintiffs’ assertion that Arizona has somehow exempted itself from the 
operation of federal law, thus nullifying the ACA, is groundless.  Plaintiffs’ attack on the 
IPAB fares no better.  Although plaintiffs prefer to employ a cobbled-together “totality of 
the factors” test to evaluate the constitutionality of the Board, the governing precedent 
asks only whether the statute contains an “intelligible principle” constraining the Board’s 
discretion, which the ACA surely does. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the Minimum 
Coverage Provision and to the IPAB 
 Despite half a dozen opportunities to cure his jurisdictional deficiencies, plaintiff 
Coons has failed to do so.  He still does not contend that he is currently taking any steps 
to prepare for the minimum coverage provision when it takes effect in 2014 or that the 
provision has affected him in any way.2
                                                          
2
  If this Court were to disagree, however, the government respectfully requests the 
opportunity to take jurisdictional discovery in an effort to establish that any future injury 
to Coons is speculative and hypothetical.  Plaintiffs object to the government’s proposed 
jurisdictional discovery because it is supposedly “utterly irrelevant and immaterial in this 
case.”  Pls.’ Reply at 19.  In support, plaintiffs quote the government’s argument that “the 
validity of a regulation under the Commerce Clause does not turn on a specific person’s 
actual conduct or circumstance.”  Id.  (citation and quotation omitted).  There is a 
difference, however, between jurisdiction and the merits.  Before a court addresses the 
merits, it must determine whether it has jurisdiction.  The government’s proposed 
discovery—addressing issues such as Coons’s plans to pay for any unexpected or 
catastrophic medical costs, whether he has applied or would apply for any jobs that might 
offer health insurance, what effect any change in his current health or financial conditions 
or those of his family might have on his decisions regarding insurance in 2014—is 
relevant to jurisdiction, not to the merits.  In other words, the government’s discovery 
would test whether Coons is likely to be affected by the minimum coverage provision 
  See Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”), 
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ECF No. 67, at ¶ 45.  Baldwin v. Sebelius, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3524287, at *2 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 12, 2011) (rejecting a claim of standing to challenge the minimum coverage 
provision in part because “[Baldwin] also does not claim, like some other plaintiffs who 
have brought similar suits, that he must save money now to purchase insurance in 2014”).  
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Baldwin, which is curiously not discussed or even 
cited in plaintiffs’ briefing, further undermines Coons’ standing to challenge the 
minimum coverage provision.3
 Nor do plaintiffs Eric Novack, Jeff Flake, and Trent Franks have standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the IPAB.  It is a matter of sheer speculation whether 
the Board (which does not yet exist) will issue proposals in 2014 that will affect Dr. 
Novack’s practice in particular.  Plainitffs make no effort to argue otherwise.  And 
plaintiffs Flake and Franks, as federal legislators, plainly lack standing to allege a “type 
of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative power), which necessarily damages 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when it takes effect in 2014.  It would have nothing to do with the merits, i.e., whether 
Congress had a rational basis to use its enumerated powers to enact the minimum 
coverage provision. 
3  Contrary to plaintiffs’ view, the government was not obligated to file a Rule 56(d) 
motion and affidavit before opposing plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  Rule 
56(d) requires such a motion or affidavit only when the nonmovant believes that it 
“cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  At this 
point, without a ruling on the jurisdictional issues presented in the government’s motion 
to dismiss, the government believes that it can present facts necessary to justify its 
opposition; indeed, the government’s position is that the second amended complaint is 
subject to dismissal on its face because, among other reasons, Coons does not allege an 
injury in fact.  If this Court were to disagree, however, the government would file a 
motion and affidavit under Rule 56(d).  Contrary to plaintiffs’ view, the government is 
not under an obligation at this juncture to notice specific depositions or submit specific 
interrogatories.  The scope of discovery that the government might seek would depend in 
part on this Court’s decision on the jurisdictional issues presented in this case.  To 
undertake specific discovery at this point would therefore be wasteful and premature. 
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all Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”  Raines, 521 U.S. at 
821. 
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Legitimate Exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Power 
 
 Relying heavily on the Eleventh Circuit panel majority’s recent decision in State 
of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3519178 
(11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011), and failing even to acknowledge the Sixth Circuit panel 
majority’s far better-reasoned decision in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, --- F.3d ---, 
2011 WL 2556039 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011), plaintiffs argue that the minimum coverage 
provision exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Plaintiffs’ claims are flawed.4
A. The minimum coverage provision falls well within the limits on 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power as recognized in Lopez and 
Morrison 
 
 
Relying on the Eleventh Circuit majority’s decision in Florida, plaintiffs argue 
that, if a court were to recognize the validity of the minimum coverage provision, there 
would be no “judicially enforceable stopping point [for Congress’s commerce power].”  
Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *53.  However, as the government explained in prior 
                                                          
4  The government advises the Court of the Fourth Circuit’s decisions in Liberty 
University v. Geithner, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), and 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3925617 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 
2011).  In Liberty University, the Fourth Circuit (per Judge Motz) held that the Anti-
Injunction Act bars the individual plaintiffs from bringing a pre-enforcement challenge to 
the minimum coverage provision.  Concurring, Judge Wynn stated that he would uphold 
the provision under Congress’s taxing power if the Anti-Injunction Act bar did not apply.  
Judge Davis dissented from the majority’s jurisdictional ruling and explained that he 
would uphold the minimum coverage provision under Congress’s commerce power.  In 
Commonwealth of Virginia, the panel (per Judge Motz) unanimously held that the 
Commonwealth lacks standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision. 
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briefing, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence already establishes limits that are in no way 
implicated by the minimum coverage provision.  In particular, the Court has held that 
noneconomic, stand-alone measures, such as those at issue in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), fall outside the 
commerce power, while economic regulations of a market—including restrictions on the 
terms of sale and supply and demand—within a broader regulatory scheme are within the 
commerce power.  See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).    
Under that precedent, the minimum coverage provision is well within 
constitutional bounds.  Indeed, “the concern directly animating Lopez and Morrison—the 
noneconomic character of the regulated activities—is not present in this case, where the 
failure to obtain health insurance is manifestly an economic fact with direct effects on the 
interstate markets for both health insurance and health services.”  Liberty University, 
2011 WL 3962915, at *38 (Davis, J., dissenting).  See Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, 
at *11-12 (Martin, J.); id. at *25 (Sutton, J., concurring in judgment) (the minimum 
coverage provision “steers clear of the central defect in the laws at issue in Lopez and 
Morrison”); see also Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *105 (Marcus, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]pholding the individual mandate leaves fully intact all of the existing limitations 
drawn around Congress’s Commerce Clause power.”). 
B. The minimum coverage provision regulates economic activity 
Plaintiffs’ argument that the minimum coverage provision does not regulate 
economic activity and therefore this Court need not determine “whether Congress has a 
‘rational basis’ for concluding that the regulated ‘activities, when taken in the aggregate, 
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substantially affect interstate commerce,’”  Pls.’ Reply at 3 (quoting Florida, 2011 WL at 
3519178, at *55) (emphasis in original), is also baseless.  As the Sixth Circuit observed, 
“[c]onsumption of health care falls squarely within Raich’s definition of economics, and 
virtually every individual in this country consumes these services.”  Thomas More, 2011 
WL 2556039, at *11.  Indeed, the “activity of foregoing health insurance and attempting 
to cover the cost of health care needs by self-insuring is no less economic than the 
activity of purchasing an insurance plan.  Thus, the financing of health care services, and 
specifically the practice of self-insuring, is economic activity.”  Id.; see also SMF ¶ 37. 
 It is for this reason that the Eleventh Circuit majority’s reduction of the minimum 
coverage provision to a regulation of “purchasing decisions”—and its rejection of such 
regulation on a categorical basis untethered to the market context in which the regulation 
occurs—is without merit.  The Eleventh Circuit majority ignores the “long-accepted 
instruction that [courts] review the constitutionality of an exercise of commerce power 
not through the lens of formal, categorical distinctions, but rather through a pragmatic 
one.”  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *83 (Marcus, J., dissenting); cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (“[w]hether the subject of the regulation in question was 
‘production,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is . . . not material” to the analysis).   
 The practical approach dictated by precedent necessarily recognizes that, unlike 
the typical consumer “good” or “service,” health insurance is not purchased for its own 
sake; rather, health insurance is the predominant means of payment for health care 
services, and the act of forgoing insurance in favor of attempting to pay health care costs 
out of pocket is another (though generally unsuccessful) means of payment within the 
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same “health care delivery” market.  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *10 (Martin, 
J.); see id. at *29 (Sutton, J. concurring) (“self-insurance and private insurance are two 
forms of action for addressing the same risk”).  See SMF ¶¶ 8-9. 
 Indeed, as Judge Marcus observed, “the markets for health insurance and health 
care services are deeply and inextricably bound together,” and Congress “indicated 
clearly that it sought to regulate across them both.”  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *87 
(Marcus, J., dissenting).  SMF ¶ 8.  Plaintiffs and the Eleventh Circuit majority 
acknowledge as much by recognizing that Congress “may constitutionally require the 
uninsured to obtain health care insurance on the hospital doorstep.”  Id. at *91 (citing 
Maj. Op. at 129-30); see also Pls.’ Reply at 5 (“If the Mandate were actually regulating 
people who use health care services, as Defendants argue, then it would have to be 
conditioned on actual consumption of health care services. . . .”).  But “[r]equiring 
insurance today and requiring it at a future point of sale amount to policy differences in 
degree, not kind.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *30 (Sutton, J.).  Given the 
undisputed function of health care insurance as a means of financing health care, “[t]here 
is no doctrinal basis for requiring Congress to wait until the cost-shifting problem 
materializes for each uninsured person before it may regulate the uninsured as a class.”  
Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *93.  Indeed, “it is difficult to imagine that Commerce 
Clause analysis would aggregate individuals and allow regulation of entire classes but 
then, when legislators confront a problem requiring a remedy before emergencies (and 
their ever-growing costs) occur, refuse to permit them to adopt the time-horizon 
necessary to enact a solution.”  Liberty University, 2011 WL 3962915, at *41 (Davis, J., 
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dissenting).  As the government explained in prior briefing, the link between the 
existence of a class of uninsured individuals, on the one hand, and cost-shifting within the 
health care market, on the other, is “direct[] and immediate[].”  Florida, 2011 WL 
3519178, at *106.   
As a class, the uninsured “are actively consuming substantial quantities of health 
care services now,” and are thus currently shifting costs to other market participants.  Id. 
at *93 (emphasis in original).  Once “Congress concluded that the ‘total incidence’ of 
health care consumption by the uninsured threatened the national health insurance and 
health care services markets[,]” “[i]t was free to regulate the ‘entire class’ of the 
uninsured.”  Id. at *95.  Therefore, there are no grounds for concluding that Congress 
lacked a rational basis for its regulation in the face of estimates that, without the 
minimum coverage provision, the increase in the number of individuals with insurance 
coverage as a result of the Act would be reduced “by 50 percent to 75 percent.”  
JONATHAN GRUBER, HEALTH CARE REFORM WITHOUT THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 2 
(Feb. 2011).5
                                                          
5  See also, e.g., RAND POLICY BRIEF, ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (H.R. 3590) 2 (2010) 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2010/Rand_RB9514.PDF (concluding that 
“[t]he individual mandate has the largest independent effect on increasing coverage,” and 
that, “[i]n the absence of a penalty for noncompliance with the individual mandate, 10 
million more people would be uninsured.”); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS 
OF ELIMINATING THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE 2 (June 16, 
2010) (eliminating minimum coverage provision would raise number of uninsured in 
2019 by 16 million people); M. BUETTGENS, B. GARRETT, AND J. HOLAHAN, WHY THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE MATTERS (Urban Institute), Dec. 2010 at 1 (“Uncompensated 
care would decline by $42.4 billion under the ACA, but by $14.7 billion under reform 
without a mandate because of the large number of people remaining uninsured.”). 
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III. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Necessary and Proper to the Exercise of 
Congress’s Constitutional Power to Regulate the Health Insurance Industry 
 Plaintiffs cannot deny that the minimum coverage provision satisfies the rational 
basis standard applied since M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  They instead suggest that United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010), (without saying so) overthrew centuries of 
precedent and demanded a heightened standard of review for exercises of power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Pls.’ Reply at 7.  But Comstock did no such thing.  It 
did not establish a new “five factor[],” id., test under the Necessary and Proper Clause; it 
instead reiterated M’Culloch and its progeny, which recognize that the Clause “‘leaves to 
Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given 
power,’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903)), 
and identified five considerations, specific to that case, that supported the Court’s 
judgment. 
 Nor is there substance to plaintiffs’ and the Eleventh Circuit’s statement that 
finding the minimum coverage provision to be “essential” would create a “magic words 
test, where Congress’s statement that a regulation is ‘essential’ thereby immunizes its 
enactment from constitutional inquiry.”  Pls.’ Reply at 7 (quoting Florida, 2011 WL 
3519178, at *64).  Rejecting such an argument in Raich, the Court explained that, “[e]ven 
putting aside the political checks that would generally curb Congress’ power to enact a 
broad and comprehensive scheme for the purpose of targeting purely local activity, there 
is no suggestion that the CSA constitutes the type of ‘evasive’ legislation the dissent 
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fears, nor could such an argument plausibly be made.”  545 U.S. at 25 n.34.  Here, too, 
there can be no suggestion that the comprehensive regulatory measures of the ACA are 
an evasive “constitutional cover” for the minimum coverage provision.  Rather, the ACA 
addressed a national crisis in which millions were denied coverage based on pre-existing 
conditions, coverage was unaffordable for many, and health care costs spiraled out of 
control. 
Moreover, the means chosen by Congress to effectuate the Affordable Care Act’s 
regulatory goals are clearly proper, as they are tailored to the unique conditions of the 
interstate health care market: participation is essentially universal; the need for medical 
treatment may arise unexpectedly and not as a matter of choice; the cost of care may 
overwhelm the typical family budget; and, in times of need, individuals are entitled to 
obtain expensive medical services without regard to their ability to pay.  The minimum 
coverage requirement ensures that non-exempted individuals who can afford it will have 
insurance for the services they consume, rather than shift their costs to others. 
IV. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Also Valid as an Exercise of Congress’s 
Taxing Power 
 
 If a taxpayer fails to comply with the terms of the minimum coverage provision, 
the result is an addition to his income tax liability that is reported on his annual return and 
that is paid in the same manner as other taxes.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(2).  The provision 
will collect $4 billion a year for the general treasury.  Letter from Congressional Budget 
Office (“CBO”) Director Douglas Elmendorf to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, table 4 
(Mar. 20, 2010); SMF ¶ 44.  Because it has the “practical operation” of a tax, Nelson v. 
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Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941), and is “productive of some revenue,” 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937), it is a valid exercise of the taxing 
power. 
 Plaintiffs continue to claim that Section 5000A is invalid because it is 
“regulatory.”  Pls.’ Reply at 8.  But it has long been recognized that Congress may use its 
taxing power for regulatory purposes, including purposes beyond its other enumerated 
powers.  “From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes 
although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered 
apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation 
directly addressed to their accomplishment.”  A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 
47 (1934); see also United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 (1919); 1 Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 965 (5th ed. 1891) (“the taxing 
power is often, very often, applied for other purposes than revenue”); Liberty University, 
2011 WL 3962915, at *17 (“[N]either an exaction’s label nor its regulatory intent or 
effect is germane to the constitutional inquiry.”) (Wynn, J., concurring).  The Court did 
briefly depart from this approach during the Lochner era to invalidate a tax if it had a 
primarily regulatory purpose, see Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 
259 U.S. 20 (1922).  But the Court quickly recognized that virtually every tax has some 
regulatory aspect, and that courts are ill-suited to police legislative motives in this 
manner.  The Court thus has “abandoned” its prior “distinctions between regulatory and 
revenue-raising taxes.”  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974). 
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 What survives from the Lochner-era cases is not a prohibition against regulatory 
taxes, as plaintiffs suggest, but instead the notion that “‘the extension of the penalizing 
features of the so-called tax’” can cause it to “lose[] its character as such.’”  Dep’t of 
Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (quoting Hamilton, 292 U.S. 
at 46).  Plaintiffs are correct to note that “there is a firm distinction between a tax and a 
penalty,” Pls.’ Reply at 8 (quoting Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *69), but that 
distinction does not turn, as they apparently believe, on the statutory label.  Instead, the 
court “must ascribe to [a taxing provision] the character disclosed by its purpose and 
operation, regardless of name.”  United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935).  
See also License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 471 (1867) (upholding statute requiring 
payment of fee for “licenses” as an exercise of the taxing power: “The granting of a 
license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a 
tax[.]”); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (assessment labeled as a 
“penalty” was in fact a tax in its practical operation). 
Apart from the label, the minimum coverage provision “lack[s] the punitive 
character of other measures the Supreme Court has held to be penalties.”  Liberty 
University, 2011 WL 3962915, at *21 (Wynn, J., concurring).  It does not turn on the 
taxpayer’s scienter, see Bailey, 259 U.S. at 37.  The tax is not conditioned on the 
commission of a crime.  See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781 (citing United States v. 
Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950)).  The penalty can be no more than the cost of qualifying 
insurance, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1)(B), demonstrating Congress’s goal to enact an 
incentive for taxpayers to obtain health insurance but not a punishment beyond the 
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amount reasonably deemed necessary to create that incentive.  Section 5000A thus stands 
in contrast with other provisions where the Court found a “highly exorbitant” tax rate to 
show an intent to “punish rather than to tax.”  Constantine, 296 U.S. at 294-95; see also 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780.  As there is a “rational foundation” for the amount of the 
penalty, it has a “civil character” and is a valid exercise of the taxing power.  Sanchez, 
340 U.S. at 45.  
V. Plaintiffs’ Alternative Preemption Claim Is Meritless 
 It is doubtful that the ACA and Arizona’s “Health Care Freedom Act” are in 
conflict at all; the latter most likely adopts only a rule of construction for state law.  But if 
the state statute were read to attempt to preclude the operation of federal law in Arizona, 
there is no doubt that the Supremacy Clause would preclude that attempt.  Plaintiffs argue 
to the contrary because “the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and 
historically, a matter of local concern.”  Pls.’ Reply at 13 (quoting Florida, 2011 WL 
3519178, at *60 (internal citation omitted)).  This argument is both irrelevant and wrong.  
It is irrelevant because there are no areas reserved to the states in which they may 
preempt otherwise valid federal laws.  It is wrong because, contrary to plaintiffs’ claim, 
Congress has repeatedly exercised its constitutional authority to regulate the business of 
health insurance, for example, by providing directly for government-funded health 
insurance through the Medicare Act, and by adopting numerous statutes regulating the 
content of policies offered by private insurers.  Indeed, “the federal government has come 
to occupy much of the field of the regulation of health benefits, and many state and local 
attempts to regulate health insurance have been held preempted.”  Liberty University, 
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2011 WL 3962915, at *38 (Davis, J., dissenting); see also Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at 
*88-89, 97 (Marcus, J. dissenting).6
Moreover, as the government has explained, the problems that Congress sought to 
address through its guaranteed issue and community rating reforms are national problems 
that individual states have been unable to effectively resolve on their own (in addition to 
being unable to resolve them in the absence of a minimum coverage provision).  See SMF 
¶¶ 28-29.  Given the national scope of the relevant markets, the problems Congress 
sought to address, and the long history of federal regulation in these areas, there is no 
legitimate basis for concluding that the ACA is not entitled to preemptive force.  Indeed, 
contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion otherwise, the minimum coverage provision, as part of 
   
                                                          
6
  In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, Pub L. 
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (“ERISA”), establishing federal requirements for health 
insurance plans offered by private employers. In 1985, Congress passed the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 
(“COBRA”), allowing certain workers who lose health benefits to continue receiving 
some benefits from their group health plans for a time. In 1996, Congress enacted the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(“HIPAA”), among other things, prohibiting group health plans from discriminating 
against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health status, requiring insurers 
to offer coverage to small businesses, and limiting the pre-existing condition exclusion 
for group health plans and issuers offering group health insurance coverage.  26 U.S.C. 
§§ 9801-9803; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181(a), 1182.  HIPAA added certain requirements for 
individual health insurance coverage to the Public Health Service Act.  Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 111, 110 Stat. 1936.  See also Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (regulating limits on mental health benefits); Newborns’ and 
Mothers’ Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2935 
(requiring maternity coverage to provide at least a 48-hour hospital stay following 
childbirth); Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 902, 
112 Stat. 2681 (requiring certain plans to offer benefits related to mastectomies). More 
recently, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881 (“MHPAEA”), 
required parity between mental health benefits and medical/surgical benefits.  Id. §§ 701-
02.  The ACA builds on these federal laws regulating health insurance. 
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Congress’s effort to regulate the interstate health care and health insurance markets, to 
prevent cost shifting by the uninsured, and to bar discrimination based on an individual’s 
medical status or history, falls squarely on the “truly national” side of the Supreme 
Court’s established line.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.  
VI. The ACA Contains an Intelligible Principle That Constrains the Discretion of 
the Independent Payment Advisory Board 
 Although plaintiffs continue to apply a cobbled-together “totality of the factors” 
test to evaluate the ACA’s creation of the IPAB, see Pls.’ Reply at 12, the relevant 
question in a non-delegation challenge is whether Congress has provided an “intelligible 
principle” to guide an agency’s discretion.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989).  As the government has shown, under that standard, the pages of detailed 
guidance contained in the ACA—limiting the types of proposals the Board may issue and 
requiring proposals to meet certain requirements—easily establish an intelligible 
principle and more.  Plaintiffs’ claim that “IPAB represents the most sweeping delegation 
of congressional authority in history, a delegation that is anathema to our constitutional 
system of Separation of Powers and to responsible, accountable, democratic 
lawmaking[,]” is therefore not only hyperbolic, it is baseless.  Pls.’ Reply at 12. 
Indeed, for the first time, plaintiffs acknowledge that “the statute does state a list 
of requirements that IPAB’s legislative proposals must meet.”  Id. at 9.  In plaintiffs’ 
view, however, “the problem is that the statute does not provide boundaries beyond 
which IPAB’s legislative proposals may not go.”  Id.  Those boundaries, however, are 
plainly delineated in the text of the statute.  A proposal, for example, may not “be 
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expected to result, over the 10-year period starting with the implementation year, in any 
increase in the total amount of net Medicare program spending relative to the total 
amount of net Medicare program spending that would have occurred absent such 
implementation.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(C).  Nor may a proposal “include any 
recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues or Medicare beneficiary premiums . 
. . increase Medicare beneficiary cost-sharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and 
copayments), or otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility criteria.”  Id. § 
1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii).   
Plaintiffs object that “these so-called prohibitions can only be as effective as they 
are defined, and they are undefined in the most serious of ways.”  Pls.’ Reply at 9.  
Plaintiffs speculate, for example, that without judicial review “IPAB and IPAB alone will 
be free to define rationing, with nothing to constrain it.”  Id.  But this is just an attempt to 
rephrase plaintiffs’ prior argument that the ACA’s preclusion of judicial review over the 
Secretary’s implementation of Board proposals renders the Board unconstitutional—a 
proposition that the Ninth Circuit has already squarely rejected.  See United States v. 
Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1041-45 (9th Cir. 1992).  Indeed, under plaintiffs’ theory, 
Bozarov must have been wrongly decided, as the Secretary of Commerce in that case 
would have been “free to define . . . with nothing to constrain it” the Export 
Administration Act’s provisions governing the imposition of export controls.  Contrary to 
plaintiffs’ hyperbole, the prohibitions contained in the ACA have real effect.  It is 
difficult to imagine, for example, how the Board could be “free to define” its way out of a 
prohibition on raising revenues, restricting benefits, or modifying eligibility criteria.  
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 For these reasons, as the government has explained, the ACA’s delegation to the 
IPAB contains far more of an intelligible principle even than those statutes the Supreme 
Court has upheld against non-delegation doctrine challenges.  Plaintiffs’ non-delegation 
claim should accordingly be rejected. 
VII. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Severable from the Vast Majority of the 
ACA 
Plaintiffs do not seriously dispute that the vast majority of the ACA’s provisions 
are severable from the minimum coverage provision.  As the Eleventh Circuit panel 
majority concluded in rejecting the argument that plaintiffs urge here, “the lion’s share of 
the Act has nothing to do with private insurance, much less the mandate that individuals 
buy insurance.”  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *77.  Indeed, many provisions of the Act 
amended longstanding programs.  For example, more than 20 sections of the Act made 
changes to Medicare payment rates starting in 2011.  Those revisions have already been 
incorporated through notice and comment rulemaking into Medicare payment regulations 
and implemented through changes to nearly every major Medicare claims processing 
system, including those for inpatient services, outpatient services, and physician services.  
See 75 Fed. Reg. 73170 (Nov. 29, 2010); 75 Fed. Reg. 71800 (Nov. 24, 2010); 75 Fed. 
Reg. 50042 (Aug. 16, 2010).  The Act also includes provisions, noted by the Supreme 
Court, that “provide[] for more rigorous enforcement” of pre-existing statutory drug 
pricing requirements, Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1346 (2011), 
and that “amend[] the public disclosure bar” in the False Claims Act, Schindler Elevator 
Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1889 n.1 (2011). 
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As plaintiffs observe, the government acknowledges that the guaranteed-issue and 
community-rating provisions due to take effect in 2014 cannot be severed from the 
minimum coverage requirement.  The requirement is integral to these provisions which 
go into effect along with it in 2014 and provide that insurers must extend coverage and 
set premiums without regard to pre-existing medical conditions.  But that limited 
concession provides no basis for not severing any other provision of the Act.   
Nor is plaintiffs’ purported difficulty in “sift[ing] through the entire massive law 
to determine which provisions are dependent and whether the law can stand without 
them,” Pls.’ Reply at 16, a ground for invalidating them all.  “[S]everability is 
fundamentally rooted in a respect for separation of powers and notions of judicial 
restraint.”  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178, at *76.  Because “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality 
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people,” a court must “refrain 
from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.”  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 
641, 652 (1984).  To the extent that plaintiffs find it difficult to assess whether provisions 
are severable from the minimum coverage provision, the proper course is to leave them in 
place, not void them. 
VIII. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike the Government’s Statement of Material Facts 
Should Be Denied 
 
After the government filed its motion to dismiss, plaintiffs moved to convert that 
motion into one for summary judgment, asserting that the government introduced 
“evidence” by reciting the factual background that supported Congress’s rational basis to 
enact the minimum coverage provision.  See Pls.’ Mot. to Treat Mot. to Dismiss as Mot. 
Case 2:10-cv-01714-GMS   Document 74   Filed 09/12/11   Page 24 of 28
 19 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
 
 
 
for Summ. J., ECF No. 48.  Now, plaintiffs move to strike the government’s statement of 
material facts, asserting that the issues in this case are purely legal and that what was 
previously “evidence” requiring conversion to a motion for summary judgment is now 
not really evidence at all.  Through these two steps, plaintiffs seek to preclude this Court 
from reviewing any of the background upon which Congress relied.  This attempt is 
frivolous. 
 Plaintiffs principally contend that paragraphs 1 – 44 should be stricken because 
this case presents pure questions of law.  See Mot. to Strike 1-4, ECF No. 71.  But 
plaintiffs do not understand the nature of the question presented here.  The scope of 
Congress’s authority under its enumerated powers is indeed a question of law, but not 
because no facts are relevant.  Instead, this case involves questions of law because the 
relevant facts are entrusted to Congress, not to this Court.  As the government has 
explained, a court reviewing a challenge to legislation enacted under the Commerce 
Clause must “determine whether . . . a ‘rational basis’ exists for . . . concluding” that the 
regulated activity “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  
That question depends in part on the evidence that Congress either did consider or could 
have considered when enacting the challenged regulation.  Indeed, Raich itself repeatedly 
cited the same type of evidence that the government has submitted here.  See, e.g., id. at 
10 n.9 & n.10 (book); id. at 11 n.14 & n.16 (more books); id. at 12 n.18 (Almanac) & 
n.19 & n.20 (congressional findings); id. at 13 n.21 (legislative history); id. at 14 n.22 
(legislative history); id. at 15 n.23 (book); id. at 21 n.31 (report from the Executive Office 
of the President); id. at 22 n.33; id. at 27 n.37; id. at 31 n.41 (reports from the Executive 
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Office of the President and the DEA). 
 Plaintiffs’ other objections to the government’s statement of material facts are 
equally insubstantial.  They suggest that paragraph 45 should “undisputedly” be stricken 
because the government has somehow “conceded” in a separate case that Coons has 
standing.   That is not so.  The government has conceded in certain cases that plaintiffs 
who identify a current, specific injury as a result of the minimum coverage provision 
have standing to challenge the provision.  This is not such a case; plaintiff Coons 
identifies a speculative future injury only.  Although plaintiffs and the Florida court are 
correct that an injury need not occur immediately to create standing, it is equally true that 
a speculative and hypothetical future injury—the type of injury at issue here—is not 
sufficient.  Plaintiffs’ repetitive hearsay objections are also baseless, as the government 
offers these facts not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show that Congress could 
have considered them and therefore had a rational basis to determine that the minimum 
coverage provision regulates conduct with substantial effects on interstate commerce.  
See FCC v. Beach Comm’s, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  Finally, plaintiffs cite no 
provision of the Local Rules prohibiting the submission of a statement of material facts in 
paragraph form.  The motion to strike should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
 Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be denied, and the government’s 
motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
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